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Abstract
Background People with anxiety difficulties show different patterns in their deployment of attention to threat compared 
to people without anxiety difficulties. These attentional biases are assumed to play a critical role in the development and 
persistence of anxiety. However, little is known about factors that influence attentional biases to threat. An emerging body 
of evidence suggests that visual attention to threat varies across the time course according to one’s motivation to approach 
vs. avoid threat.
Methods In order to better understand the relationship between motivation, attentional biases to threat, and anxiety, we had 
participants high in spider fear complete a sustained-attention task in full view of a live tarantula while their eye movements 
were tracked.
Results Participants who were ambivalent about whether to look at the spider or to avoid looking exhibited a unique pattern 
of visual attention to the spider, and reported higher spider fear and more negative affect than did other participants at the 
end of the study.
Conclusions Our findings suggest that anxiety persistence may have more to do with goal prioritization than innate attentional 
biases. Future studies of attentional biases to threat should take motivation into account and study attention across the time 
course. Ambivalent motivation to threat should also be targeted in exposure therapy.
Keywords Attentional bias to threat · Approach-avoidance conflict · Ambivalent motivation · Spider fear · Spider anxiety
Introduction
It is generally accepted that anxiety influences attentional 
deployment to threat cues (see Bar-Haim et al. 2007; Cisler 
and Koster 2010; Mathews and Mackintosh 1998; Mogg 
and Bradley 1998; Williams et al. 1988). People with high 
trait anxiety exhibit three types of attentional biases. The 
first is rapid detection of threat relative to neutral cues, 
and is referred to as “facilitated attention” (e.g., Yiend and 
Mathews 2001). The second is sustained attention to threat 
and longer latency to shift attention away from threat, which 
are referred to collectively as “difficulty disengaging from 
threat” (e.g., Fox et al. 2001). The third type of bias is pref-
erential allocation of attention towards locations opposite the 
location of the threat cue, referred to as “attentional avoid-
ance” (e.g., Koster et al. 2006).
These attentional biases may be important factors in the 
development and persistence of anxiety problems. Atten-
tional biases to threat have been observed in almost all anxi-
ety and related disorders, including social anxiety disorder 
(Amir et al. 2003), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cisler 
and Olatunji 2010), generalized anxiety disorder (Mogg and 
Bradley 2005; Rinck et al. 2003), panic disorder (Buckley 
et al. 2002), post-traumatic stress disorder (Bryant and Har-
vey 1995), and spider phobia (Rinck et al. 2005). Moreover, 
results from a meta-analysis of 172 studies (Bar-Haim et al. 
2007) confirmed that there is a robust link between atten-
tional biases to threat and anxiety, with an effect size of 
d = 0.45.
Decades of research has established that attentional 
biases to threat follow a vigilant-avoidant pattern (Mogg 
and Bradley 1998), with facilitated attention to threat 
occurring at an early, automatic stage of processing and 
avoidance of threat occurring at a later, strategic stage 
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of processing (see Derryberry and Reed 2002; Mogg 
et al. 2004). More importantly, vigilance and avoidance 
combined result in repeated brief, insufficient exposures, 
through which anxiety is maintained (Rachman 2004). 
However, little is known about factors that account for this 
drastic change in direction for attentional biases to threat. 
Cisler and Koster (2010) argued that top-down processes, 
such as motivation and goals, may play an important role 
in modulating the initial attentional deployment to threat. 
According to Cisler and Koster (2010), attentional biases 
to threat may reflect “purposeful attempts to detect and 
cope with disorder-relevant sources of threat in the envi-
ronment” (p. 211). For example, individuals who are moti-
vated to cope with negative emotions induced by threat, 
may override their initial, automatic bias towards threat 
and deploy their attention away from threat later in the 
time course.
Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence showing 
that motivation does influence attentional processing of 
threat at a later stage of processing. Richeson and Trawalter 
(2008) found that participants who were highly motivated to 
respond to pictures without a racial bias showed facilitated 
attention to pictures of non-white people presented at stimu-
lus durations of 30 ms and avoidance of non-white faces at 
stimulus durations of 450 ms. Johnson (2009) found that 
participants instructed to pay attention to happy faces and to 
avoid angry faces showed facilitated attention towards happy 
faces and avoidance of angry faces at stimulus durations of 
1250 ms. Dunning and Hajcak (2009) found that partici-
pants instructed to pay attention to non-arousing aspects of 
unpleasant pictures displayed decreased late positive poten-
tial, which indicates reduced facilitated attention.
There are two fundamental systems of motivation, namely 
approach and avoidance motivation (see Elliot and Thrash 
2002; Gray and McNaughton 2000). However, to conceptu-
alize anxiety as a dominance of one motivation over another 
may be oversimplifying. When faced with a threat in eve-
ryday life, people may have conflicting goals; on the one 
hand, they may think it is important to attend to the threat to 
keep themselves safe, but on the other hand doing so might 
detract from their current tasks or cause distress. The extent 
to which they attend to threat may have more to do with their 
situational goals than the emotional valence of the present-
ing stimulus. For example, people high in spider fear may 
be motivated to attend to spider stimuli, as they have been 
found to detect pictures of spiders more rapidly than neutral 
pictures (Ohman et al. 2001) and take longer to switch from 
spider cues to neutral cues (Paulitzki et al. 2008; Wilson 
et al. 2015). At the same time, people high in spider fear 
may also be motivated to avoid paying attention to spider 
stimuli, as they have been found to spend less time looking 
at spider images than neutral images (Hermans et al. 1999; 
Rinck and Becker 2006).
However, the above-mentioned studies were not without 
caveats. As Cisler and Koster (2010) pointed out, many of 
the paradigms used to study attentional deployment to threat 
assess attention at varying stimulus duration presentations 
(e.g., ranging from 17 to 500 ms) as opposed to examining 
attention across time. Hence, it would be difficult to observe 
the influence of top-down process (such as motivation) on 
attention. Secondly, it should be noted that almost all previ-
ous studies examined spider-fearful individuals’ attentional 
deployment to pictures of spiders instead of real spiders 
(e.g., Mogg and Bradley 2006; Vrijsen et al. 2009), thus 
limiting the ecological validity of their results.
In addition, these quite different biases could reflect not 
only the point in time at which the stimuli were presented 
(i.e., early vs. later stages of processing), but also goal con-
flict (i.e., approach vs. avoidance motivation). To examine 
the role of goal conflict in spider anxiety, Pittig et al. (2014) 
presented spider-fearful individuals with a gambling task 
that involved choosing cards from multiple decks which 
either had pictures of spiders on them and yielded greater 
gains, or featured pictures of butterflies and yielded greater 
losses. Participants showed initial avoidance of spider pic-
tures and, despite some improvements over time, generally 
failed to learn to use the advantageous deck, in this case 
sacrificing reward in the service of anxiety reduction. When 
people have difficulty deciding which of the two conflicting 
goals to pursue, greater distress may result. Healey et al. 
(2019) had participants list and rate the importance of rea-
sons for approaching and for avoiding spiders. Participants 
completed a self-directed exposure task and reported their 
spider-related distress two weeks following the exposure. 
Higher goal conflict was associated with higher distress at 
both baseline and follow-up.
With a similar research question in mind, Nelson et al. 
(2015) examined the extent to which motivation to look at 
vs. avoid looking at threat and neutral images influenced 
visual attention to threat in participants high and low in trait 
anxiety, under counterbalanced calm and anxious mood 
induction conditions. A unique strength of this study was 
that eye movements were tracked across 5000 ms of each 
image pair exposure (e.g., one threat image paired with one 
neutral image), thus making it possible to measure changes 
in attentional deployment to threat over time. After the 
viewing task, participants rated how motivated they were 
to look at and how motivated they were to avoid looking at 
each type of images. They found small to moderate associa-
tions between motivation ratings and eye movement indices, 
which further validated their motivation measures.
When motivation was not considered, results showed 
a pattern of facilitated attention to threat in 0–1000 ms, 
followed by almost equal deployment to threat and neu-
tral images from 1000 to 5000 ms. However, results were 
quite different when motivation was taken into account. 
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Participants were divided into groups based on their moti-
vation ratings: those high in motivation to both look at threat 
and avoid looking at threat were classified as “ambivalent”; 
those high in motivation to look at threat and low in moti-
vation to avoid looking were classified as “engagers”; those 
low in motivation to look at threat and high in motivation to 
avoid were classified as “avoiders”; and those low in motiva-
tion to both look at threat and avoid looking were classified 
as “indifferent”. The engagers had a higher proportion of 
viewing time (PVT) on threat images, whereas the avoid-
ers had a lower PVT on threat images. The indifferent and 
ambivalent groups had equal PVT on threat and neutral 
images. However, the ambivalent group had a higher prob-
ability of first fixations on the threat image, and had signifi-
cantly higher trait and state anxiety than did the avoiders and 
indifferent groups.
Nelson et al. (2015) suggested that those high in trait 
anxiety may have greater difficulty prioritizing their goals 
(e.g., to prioritize safety by monitoring the threat vs. to pri-
oritize emotion regulation by avoiding the threat) and were 
thus ambivalent. Second, whereas participants motivated to 
engage or avoid threat did so successfully, the ambivalent 
group may have felt they neither monitored nor avoided 
threat satisfactorily, hence their greater state anxiety. This 
is consistent with Healey et al. (2019) and with Kelly et al. 
(2015) who proposed that poor well-being may be charac-
terized by the inability to manage and prioritize concurrent 
demands over time, and a subsequent failure to resolve goal 
conflict.
Nelson et al.’s (2015) findings suggest that there is merit 
in examining motivation when studying attentional biases to 
threat. However, there were two major limitations to their 
study. First, they examined visual deployment to threat 
images as opposed to an actual threat cue. Although the 
images were indeed rated as threatening, many images may 
have lacked personal relevance and situational immediacy, 
thus posing a significant threat to the ecological validity of 
their findings. This limitation is not unique to Nelson et al. 
(2015) but applies to almost all existing studies looking at 
attentional biases to spiders. Second, when people encoun-
ter threat in real life they are likely to have other tasks they 
need to accomplish (independent from threat), and many 
of these tasks require considerable attentional resources. If 
so, anxious individuals are likely to struggle with resolving 
the competing goals of monitoring threat for safety and per-
forming well on an attentionally demanding task. However, 
research on this topic is scant (for a review, see Kelly et al. 
2015) and in many earlier studies, participants had to engage 
in tasks that by design involved attending to spider stimuli 
(e.g., Ohman et al. 2001; Paulitzki et al. 2008; Wilson et al. 
2015), which does not reflect real-life encounters of threat.
The current study sought to address Nelson et al.’s (2015) 
limitations by having spider-fearful individuals perform an 
attentionally demanding task in the presence of a live taran-
tula while their eye movements were tracked. Hence, we 
were able to improve the ecological validity by using actual 
threat rather than threat images, and creating a situation 
where threat was task-irrelevant and competed with the cur-
rent task for attentional resources. We also adopted the free 
viewing eye movement paradigm from Nelson et al. (2015), 
thus allowing us to understand attentional biases to threat 
across the time course (another common limitation of previ-
ous studies, see Cisler and Koster 2010). Having addressed 
these limitations, the present study aimed to extend the 
findings from Nelson et al. (2015) and Healey et al. (2019) 
and examine the following questions: (1) do spider-fearful 
individuals experience ambivalent motivation towards spi-
der; (2) to what extent does ambivalent motivation influence 
visual attention to spider; and (3) is ambivalent motivation 
associated with higher spider fear.
Based on Cisler and Koster (2010), Nelson et al. (2015), 
and Kelly et al. (2015), we further hypothesized that: (1) 
some spider-fearful individuals would exhibit high motiva-
tion to both look at and avoid looking at the spider (that is, 
would be ambivalent); (2) motivation to look at and avoid 
looking at the spider would influence visual attention such 
that the ambivalent group would uniquely show initial facili-
tated attention to the spider, but would look at the spider 
less than the engagers and more than the avoiders; and (3) 
relative to other groups, those who were ambivalent about 
whether or not to look at the spider would exhibit greater 
spider fear and more negative affect at the end of the study.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited via posters and an online sign up 
system from the University of Waterloo and were screened 
using the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski 
and O’Donohue 1995) administered online. Participants who 
scored in the top fifteenth percentile on the FSQ (i.e., with 
a minimum total score of 80), which is on par with scores 
of individuals diagnosed with clinically significant spider 
phobia (see Muris and Merckelbach 1996), were invited to 
participate. The final sample consisted of 96 participants 
(15 males) with a mean age of 19.8 years (SD = 1.4). There 
was no significant gender difference in self-report measures, 
performance on the Metronome Response Task (MRT), or 
eye movement indices (ps > 0.07). Participants received 
course credit or cash remuneration (ten Canadian dollars) in 
exchange for their participation. The protocol received ethi-
cal clearance from the Office of Research Ethics at the Uni-
versity of Waterloo and all participants provided informed 
consent.
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Self‑Report Measures
Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski and 
O’Donohue 1995) The FSQ is an 18-item scale that assesses 
negative response to and attitudes about spiders, and fear of 
harm by spiders. Participants rate their agreement with state-
ments on an 8-point Likert scale (from 1 “totally disagree” 
to 7 “totally agree”). This measure has demonstrated strong 
psychometric properties (Muris and Merckelbach 1996; 
Teachman and Woody 2003). It was used to select people 
high in spider fear.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al. 
1988) The PANAS consists of ten items measuring posi-
tive affect and ten items measuring negative affect. Using 
a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 “very slightly or not at all” 
to 5 “extremely”), participants rated the extent to which 
each item was consistent with their current mood state. 
The PANAS has demonstrated good validity and reliability 
(Crawford and Henry 2004). The PANAS was included to 
assess participants’ mood state at baseline, after introduction 
to the spider, and at the end of the study.
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS) This is a 100-point 
Likert scale on which participants rate how much they fear 
the spider at that moment from 0 (“No fear whatsoever”) 
to 100 (“An extremely high, intolerable amount of fear”). 
The SUDS is commonly used in clinical practice (Siegel 
and Warren 2013) and was included to assess participants’ 
spider fear at baseline, after introduction to the spider, and 
at the end of the study.
Motivation Ratings Participants were asked to rate the 
extent that they were motivated to look at the spider, to avoid 
looking at the spider, and to do well on the MRT. Ratings 
were made on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“no 
motivation at all”) to 9 (“very strong motivation”), at each 
of the 12 thought probes embedded in the MRT.
Metronome Response Task
The MRT (Seli et al. 2013) is a sustained-attention task in 
which participants press a spacebar in time with a metro-
nome. Participants completed 20 practice trials followed 
by 600 test trials on a computer using the E-Prime soft-
ware (Psychology Software Tools 2007). Each MRT trial 
started with 650 ms of silence, followed by a metronome 
tone which lasted for 75 ms, and then 575 ms of silence. 
As per Xu et al. (2017), thought probes were randomly 
presented within every block of 50 MRT trials, with the 
rule that there be a minimum of 10 trials between probes, 
for a total of 12 probes. At each probe, the task ceased and 
participants were prompted with a text box on the screen 
to type in, verbatim, the thought they had in the moment 
just prior. For the purposes of the current study, they 
also rated their motivation to look at the spider, to avoid 
looking at the spider, and to do well on the MRT task. 
Three independent judges were recruited to code reported 
thoughts. Each thought was assigned to one of the two 
categories: (1) spider-related thoughts, e.g., “the spider 
is moving”, and (2) other thoughts, e.g., “which gift card 
I should choose”. Inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) 
ranged from 0.95 to 0.97, suggesting excellent reliability 
across coders. Inter-rater averages were calculated and sig-
nificant discrepancies were resolved through discussion. 
The MRT lased approximately 30 min (excluding the time 
to calibrate the eye tracker).
Material and Stimuli
Participants were seated at a table  90  cm in front of 
a 15-in. desktop computer monitor and 85  cm from a 
10 × 10 × 12 cm glass terrarium and an 8 × 8 × 10 cm 
basket, positioned to the left and right of the monitor with 
an approximately 10° visual angle, counterbalanced across 
participants. The terrarium contained a live, Chilean Rose 
tarantula with a visibly ill-fitting lid and the basket contained 
a variety of gift cards. Participants were explicitly told that if 
they responded to at least 90% of the trials in the MRT, they 
could choose one of the gift cards from the basket as an addi-
tional reward (in reality, every participant was given a gift 
card). Hence, the basket of gift cards served as a reminder 
for participants to attend to the MRT, and together with the 
live spider, they created a situation where participants had 
to decide on where to deploy their attention (i.e., attending 
to the spider vs. attending to the current task).
Eye Tracking Procedure
We used a iView X™ head-mounted portable eye tracking 
device system (SensoMotoric Instruments 2009) to record 
participants’ eye movements during the course of the MRT. 
Participants had free head movement, although they were 
instructed to minimize large head movements as this could 
compromise calibration, rendering the data unusable. Eye 
movement data was coded using the BeGaze™ software 
(SensoMotoric Instruments 2014). The standard settings 
identifying saccades and fixations were used, such as that 
a saccade was considered an eye movement that reaches a 
peak velocity of 40° per second and this peak velocity must 
lie within a range of 20–80% of the distance between start 
and end; eye movements that did not meet these criteria, 
did not constitute a blink, and lasted for at least 50 ms were 
classified as fixations.
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Procedure
Participants completed the FSQ online and those with a 
total score of 80 or higher were invited to participate in this 
study. Upon their arrival at the lab, participants completed 
the PANAS and SUDS without the spider present. The 
researcher then retrieved the glass terrarium containing the 
spider, placed it in the visual field beside the monitor, and 
demonstrated that it was real and alive by prodding it gently 
with a pen to evoke movement. Participants then completed 
the PANAS and SUDS again, after which they were cali-
brated on the eye tracker and underwent the MRT. After the 
MRT, participants completed the PANAS and SUDS for the 
third time. In total, the procedure lasted roughly 60 min.
Results
Prior to conducting each analysis, outliers on the dependent 
measures (i.e., three standard deviations above or below the 
means) were corrected by replacing them with the next high-
est or lowest values. Given the small sample size for some of 
the motivation groups, we conducted post hoc power analy-
ses using the software package G*power3 (Faul et al. 2007) 
with actual sample size, observed effect size, and α set at 
0.05 (two tailed). In addition, as observed effect sizes in 
small-sample studies can be misleading, we also presented 
a priori power computations using the same software pack-
age G*power3 (Faul et al. 2007) with actual sample size, 
medium effect size (d = 0.5), and α set at 0.05 (two tailed).
Preparing Eye Movement Data
Eye movement data from 20 participants were unusable due 
to the following reasons: the eye tracker failed to calibrate 
(ten participants), tracking ratio of the eye tracker was lower 
than 50% (six participants), stimuli of interest were not 
present in the visual field (three participants), and missing 
data (one participant). Therefore, there were 76 participants 
with available eye movement data for analyses, including 
12 ambivalent, 15 engagers, 18 avoiders, and 31 indifferent.
Eye tracking was interrupted 12 times by the thought 
probes. Given that it was possible for the first probe to occur 
very shortly after the start of the task and the last probe very 
close to the end of the task, we opted to discard data from 
the beginning of the MRT to the start of the first probe and 
that from the end of the final probe to the end of the task. 
We also encountered an intractable technical problem with 
BeGaze™ software such that it was impossible to access 
data between the eleventh and twelfth thought probes for 
15 participants. We thus opted not to include this segment 
in our analyses. Therefore, there were 10 segments of eye 
movement data for each participant. We defined two areas 
of interest (AOI), which were the terrarium containing the 
spider and the basket containing the gift cards. For each 
AOI, we generated the following eye movement indices: (1) 
probability of first fixation (PFF) on a particular AOI in the 
beginning of any given segment; (2) first fixation duration 
(FFD), which reflects the average duration of the first fixa-
tions on a particular AOI; and (3) PVT, which reflects the 
percentage of time spent on looking at a particular AOI. It 
should be noted that the PFF and PVT percentages do not 
add up to 100% because participants were allowed to look 
freely and they did look at other objects in the room (e.g., 
the blank monitor, the wall, etc.).
In addition, we calculated a bias score for each of the eye 
movement indices listed above. For example, we calculated 
the PFF bias score by subtracting the PFF on gift cards from 
the PFF on the spider for each participant per segment. Like-
wise, we calculated the FFD bias score and the PVT bias 
score using the same algorithm.
Preparing Response Time Data (for the Metronome 
Response Task)
The Rhythmic Response Time (RRT) was first calculated 
as the absolute difference between the time of the key-press 
and the onset of the metronome tone. A higher RRT variance 
indicates less synchronous responding, which in turn reflects 
poorer performance (Seli et al. 2015a, b). Variance data was 
highly skewed in the positive direction, which is typical to 
studies using the MRT. Hence, we followed established pro-
cedures and adjusted the RRT variance using a natural loga-
rithm transform (see Seli et al. 2013). Mean RRT variance 
was calculated by using a moving window of the current and 
preceding four trials across all trials except the very first five 
trials and the five trials following each thought probe. Mean 
RRT variance serves as an indicator of participants’ overall 
performance on the MRT. We also calculated the propor-
tion of spider-related thoughts for each participant, which 
indicates the extent to which participants were distracted by 
the tarantula during the MRT.
Did Individuals Vary in Their Motivation to Look 
at vs. Avoid Looking at the Spider?
Overall ratings of motivation to look at and to avoid look-
ing at the spider, and overall motivation to do well on the 
MRT task were calculated by summing ratings across the 12 
thought probes. Means and standard deviations are presented 
in Table 1. The correlation between motivation to look at 
the spider and to avoid looking at the spider was almost 
zero, r = −0.01, p = 0.958. Motivation to do well on the task 
had a small but significant correlation with motivation to 
avoid looking at the spider, r = 0.249, p = 0.015, but not with 
motivation to look at the spider, r = 0.071, p = 0.490. The 
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correlation coefficients among motivation ratings, self-report 
ratings (including FSQ, mood states, spider fear), overall 
eye movement indices, and MRT performance measures are 
presented in Table 2. In general, motivation ratings appear to 
have small to moderate associations with self-report ratings, 
overall eye movement indices, and performance measures 
on the MRT.
We divided our sample into four groups based on their 
ratings to look at vs. avoid looking at the spider, as per Nel-
son et al. (2015): (1) ambivalent, i.e., those who scored 5 or 
above on both motivation to look at the spider and motiva-
tion to avoid looking at it (N = 16); (2) engagers, i.e., those 
who scored 5 or above on motivation to look at the spider 
and below 5 on motivation to avoid looking at it (N = 18); 
(3) avoiders, i.e., those who scored 5 or above on motivation 
to avoid looking at the spider and below 5 on motivation 
to look at it (N = 22); and (4) indifferent, i.e., those who 
scored below 5 on both motivation to look at the spider and 
motivation to avoid looking at it (N = 40). In addition, one-
way ANOVAs revealed no main effect of group for perfor-
mance motivation or FSQ score, ps > 0.135, suggesting that 
all groups were equally motivated to perform well on the 
task and reported similar levels of spider fear at baseline.
Our first hypothesis was thus confirmed: a subset of our 
sample reported ambivalent motivation towards the spider. 
Overall, motivation to look at the spider was independent 
from motivation to avoid looking at the spider.
Did Overall Visual Attention to the Spider Vary 
According to Motivation?
Means and standard deviations of overall eye movement 
indices are presented in Table 3. We first conducted a 2 
(Stimulus: spider vs. gift cards) × 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. 
engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) mixed ANOVA on 
probability of first fixation (PFF). This analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of stimulus, F (1, 71) = 43.18, 
η2p = 0.378, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori 
power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); a significant main effect 
of group, F (3, 71) = 18.39, η2p = 0.437, p < 0.001, observed 
power = 1.00, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); and 
a significant stimulus by group interaction, F (3, 71) = 20.84, 
η2p = 0.468, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori 
power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5). Follow-up paired-sample 
t-tests showed that first fixations were more likely to land 
on the spider than gift cards for the ambivalent group, t 
(11) = 2.93, p = 0.015, observed power = 0.75, a priori 
power = 0.35 (assuming d = 0.5), and engagers group, t 
(14) = 4.61, p < 0.001, observed power = 0.98, a priori 
power = 0.44 (assuming d = 0.5), but not for the indiffer-
ent group, t (30) = 0.69, p = 0.498, observed power = 0.10, 
a priori power = 0.77 (assuming d = 0.5). First fixations in 
the avoider group were neither on the spider nor on the gift 
cards.
Table 1  Motivation ratings by group
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets






to do well on 
task
All participants 96 4.24 (2.28) 4.50 (2.59) 7.77 (1.40)
Ambivalent 16 6.96 (1.21) 7.22 (1.24) 8.29 (0.77)
Engagers 18 6.74 (1.18) 2.42 (1.21) 7.58 (1.53)
Avoiders 22 2.47 (1.16) 7.44 (1.03) 8.10 (1.23)
Indifferent 40 3.01 (1.23) 2.73 (1.21) 7.47 (1.56)
Table 2  Correlations among motivation ratings, self-report ratings, 
overall eye movement indices, and MRT performance measures
Note: FSQ fear of spiders questionnaire, T1 baseline, T2 after intro-
duction to spider, T3 at end of study, PVT proportion of viewing time, 
FFD first fixation duration, PFF probability of first fixation, RRT 
rhythmic response time. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Motivation
Look at spider Avoid 
looking at 
spider
Do well on task
Motivation
 Avoid looking at 
spider
−0.01
 Do well on task 0.07 0.25*
 FSQ total score −0.10 −0.01 −0.07
Spider fear
 T1 0.12 0.35** 0.08
 T2 0.17 0.51** 0.10
 T3 0.34** 0.59** 0.22*
Positive affect
 T1 0.17 −0.13 0.41**
 T2 0.12 −0.21* 0.31*
 T3 0.20* 0.02 0.47**
Negative affect
 T1 0.24* 0.20* −0.11
 T2 0.19 0.44** −0.02
 T3 0.44** 0.48** 0.19
Overall eye movement indices
 PFF spider (%) 0.51** −0.31** −0.18
 PFF gift cards (%) −0.15 −0.19 −0.10
 FFD spider (ms) 0.14 −0.12 0.08
 FFD gift cards (ms) 0.10 0.01 0.14
 PVT spider (%) 0.54** −0.18 0.17
 PVT gift cards (%) 0.00 −0.22 0.00
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We also conducted the same 2 (Stimulus: spider vs. gift 
cards) × 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. 
indifferent) mixed ANOVA on FFD. We observed a signifi-
cant main effect of stimulus, F (1, 72) = 15.42, η2p = 0.176, 
p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a priori power = 1.00 
(assuming d = 0.5); no main effect of group, F (3, 72) = 1.35, 
η2p = 0.053, p = 0.266, observed power = 0.53, a priori 
power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); and no stimulus by group 
interaction, F (3, 72) = 0.53, η2p = 0.022, p = 0.664, observed 
power = 0.42, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5). 
Follow-up paired-sample t-tests showed that first fixations 
were significantly longer on the spider than gift certificates 
for the engagers group, t (14) = 2.56, p = 0.023, observed 
power = 0.66, a priori power = 0.44 (assuming d = 0.5), 
and indifferent group, t (30) = 2.87, p = 0.007, observed 
power = 0.79, a priori power = 0.77 (assuming d = 0.5), but 
not for the avoiders group, t (17) = 1.21, p = 0.243, observed 
power = 0.21, a priori power = 0.52 (assuming d = 0.5), 
or ambivalent group, t (11) = 2.00, p = 0.071, observed 
power = 0.44, a priori power = 0.35 (assuming d = 0.5).
Lastly, we conducted a 2 (Stimulus: spider vs. gift 
cards) × 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. 
indifferent) mixed ANOVA on PVT. This analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of stimulus, F (1, 72) = 60.32, 
η2p = 0.456, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori 
power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); a significant main effect 
of group, F (3, 72) = 5.85, η2p = 0.196, p = 0.001, observed 
power = 0.99, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); and 
a significant stimulus by group interaction, F (3, 72) = 7.04, 
η2p = 0.227, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori 
power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5). Follow-up paired-sample 
t-tests showed that all participants spent more time view-
ing the spider than gift cards (all ps < 0.031; observed 
power = 0.80 for ambivalent, 0.98 for engagers, 0.60 for 
avoiders, and 0.96 for indifferent; a priori power = 0.35 for 
ambivalent, 0.44 for engagers, 0.52 for avoiders, and 0.77 
for indifferent, assuming d = 0.5).
In addition, we performed multiple one-way ANOVAs 
in which PFF bias score, FFD bias score, and PVT bias 
score were each tested as a function of group (ambivalent 
vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent). For PFF bias 
score, we observed a significant main effect of group, F (3, 
71) = 20.84, η2p = 0.468, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, 
a priori power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5). Post hoc com-
parisons (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that the engagers group 
had a significantly higher PFF bias score than all other 
groups (all ps < 0.002; observed power = 1.00 for engagers 
vs. avoiders, 1.00 for engagers vs. ambivalent, and 1.00 for 
engagers vs. indifferent; a priori power = 0.28 for engag-
ers vs. avoiders, 0.23 for engagers vs. ambivalent, and 
0.34 for engagers vs. indifferent, assuming d = 0.5). For 
FFD bias score, we observed no significant main effect of 
group, F (3, 72) = 0.52, η2p = 0.022, p = 0.664, observed 
power = 0.16, a priori power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5). For 
PVT bias score, we observed a significant main effect of 
group, F (3, 71) = 7.04, η2p = 0.227, p < 0.001, observed 
power = 0.98, a priori power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5). 
Post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that the 
engagers group had a significantly higher PVT bias score 
than the avoiders and indifferent groups (both ps < 0.002; 
observed power = 1.00 for engagers vs. avoiders, and 
1.00 for engagers vs. indifferent; a priori power = 0.28 for 
engagers vs. avoiders, and 0.34 for engagers vs. indifferent, 
assuming d = 0.5), but there was no significant difference 
between the engagers and ambivalent group (p = 0.576; 
observed power = 0.89; a priori power = 0.24, assuming 
d = 0.5).
These findings provide some support to our hypothesis 
that the ambivalent group would display a unique pattern 
of visual attention to threat. Similar to the engagers group, 
ambivalent individuals were more likely to have their first 
fixations on the spider than gift cards. While the engag-
ers group had longer first fixations on the spider than gift 
cards, such difference was not observed among ambivalent 
individuals. Among all four groups, the engagers demon-
strated the most robust attentional bias to threat.
Table 3  Overall eye movement indices by group
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. GC gift cards, PFF probability of first fixation, FFD first fixation dura-
tion, PVT proportion of viewing time. Paired-sample t-tests were performed to examine between-group differences. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, 
***p < 0.001
Ambivalent (N = 12) Engagers (N = 15) Avoiders (N = 18) Indifferent (N = 31)
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Did Visual Attention to the Spider Vary Over Time 
According to Motivation?
Means and standard errors of segment-specific eye move-
ment indices are presented in Table 4. We first conducted a 
2 (Stimulus: spider vs. gift cards) × 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. 
engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) × 10 (Time: S1–S10) 
repeated measures ANOVA on PVT. Mauchly’s test indi-
cated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for 
main effect of time, χ2 (44) = 174.15, p < 0.001, and stimulus 
by time interaction, χ2 (44) = 181.84, p < 0.001, therefore 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt esti-
mates of sphericity (ε = 0.679 for time, and ε = 0.681 for 
stimulus by time). This analysis revealed a main effect of 
stimulus, F (1, 72) = 62.36, η2p = 0.464, p < 0.001, observed 
power = 1.00, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); a 
main effect of time, F (6.11, 439.86) = 3.84, η2p = 0.051, 
p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a priori power = 1.00 
(assuming d = 0.5); a main effect of group, F (3, 72) = 10.59, 
η2p = 0.306, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori 
power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); a stimulus by group inter-
action, F (3, 72) = 11.90, η2p = 0.332, p < 0.001, observed 
power = 0.99, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); 
a time by group interaction, F (18.33, 439.86) = 3.03, 
η2p = 0.112, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori 
power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); a stimulus by time inter-
action, F (6.13, 441.50) = 3.51, η2p = 0.046, p = 0.002, 
observed power = 0.99, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming 
d = 0.5); and a stimulus by time by group interaction, F 
(18.40, 441.50) = 4.03, η2p = 0.144, p < 0.001, observed 
power = 1.00, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5).
To explore this three-way interaction, we calculated the 
proportion viewing time (PVT) bias score by subtracting 
the PVT on gift cards from the PVT on the spider for each 
participant per segment. A PVT bias score that is signifi-
cantly greater than 0 was thus indicative of an attentional 
bias towards the spider. Likewise, a PVT bias score that is 
significantly lower than 0 was indicative an attentional bias 
towards gift cards. Means and standard errors of PVT bias 
scores are depicted in Fig. 1.
To explore if different motivation groups demonstrated 
different time courses of eye movements, we performed 
multiple one-way ANOVAs in which PVT bias score 
was tested as a function of group (ambivalent vs. engag-
ers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) within each segment. We 
observed a significant main effect of group during S1, F (3, 
72) = 7.97, η2p = 0.249, p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a 
priori power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5); S2, F (3, 72) = 6.86, 
η2p = 0.222, p < 0.001, observed power = 0.97, a priori 
power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5); S3, F (3, 72) = 7.01, 
η2p = 0.226, p < 0.001, observed power = 0.98, a priori 
power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5); S4, F (3, 72) = 8.78, 
η2p = 0.268, p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a priori 
power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5); S5, F (3, 72) = 7.73, 
η2p = 0.244, p < 0.001, observed power = 0.98, a priori 
power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5); S6, F (3, 72) = 3.87, 
η2p = 0.139, p = 0.013, observed power = 0.82, a priori 
power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5); S7, F (3, 72) = 11.98, 
η2p = 0.333, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori 
power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5); S8, F (3, 72) = 13.35, 
η2p = 0.357, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori 
power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5); S9, F (3, 72) = 8.47, 
η2p = 0.261, p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a priori 
power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5); but not during S10, F (3, 
72) = 1.44, η2p = 0.057, p = 0.239, observed power = 0.38, a 
priori power = 0.96 (assuming d = 0.5).
Table 4  Segment-specific eye movement indices by group
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. GC gift cards, PVT proportion of viewing time
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Interestingly, post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) 
showed that the ambivalent group had a sudden increase 
in their PVT bias score during S3-S4, which was not 
observed in other groups. During S1–S2, there was no sig-
nificant difference in PVT bias score between the ambiva-
lent group and all other groups (all ps > 0.077; observed 
power = 0.28/0.38 for ambivalent vs. engagers during S1/
S2, 0.72/0.48 for ambivalent vs. avoiders during S1/S2, 
and 0.39/0.12 for ambivalent vs. indifferent during S1/S2; 
a priori power = 0.24 for ambivalent vs. engagers, 0.25 for 
ambivalent vs. avoiders, and 0.30 for ambivalent vs. indif-
ferent, assuming d = 0.5), while the engagers group had a 
higher PVT bias score than avoiders and indifferent groups 
(all ps < 0.002; observed power = 0.89/0.92 for engagers vs. 
avoiders during S1/S2, and 0.83/0.79 for engagers vs. indif-
ferent during S1/S2; a priori power = 0.28 for engagers vs. 
avoiders, and 0.34 for engagers vs. indifferent, assuming 
d = 0.5). However, during S3–S4, the ambivalent group had 
a higher PVT bias score than avoiders and indifferent groups 
(all ps < 0.018; observed power = 0.51/0.91 for ambivalent 
vs. avoiders during S3/S4, and 0.64/0.80 for ambivalent vs. 
indifferent during S3/S4; a priori power = 0.25 for ambiva-
lent vs. avoiders, and 0.30 for ambivalent vs. indifferent, 
assuming d = 0.5) and there was no significant difference 
in PVT bias score between ambivalent group and engag-
ers group (both ps > 0.345; observed power = 0.05 during 
S3, and 0.18 during S4; a priori power = 0.24, assuming 
d = 0.5), while the engagers group continued to have a 
higher PVT bias score than avoiders and indifferent groups 
(all ps < 0.026; observed power = 0.90/0.94 for engagers vs. 
avoiders during S3/S4, and 0.97/0.66 for engagers vs. indif-
ferent during S3/S4; a priori power = 0.28 for engagers vs. 
avoiders, and 0.34 for engagers vs. indifferent, assuming 
d = 0.5). During S5–S6, there was again no significant dif-
ference in PVT bias score between ambivalent group and all 
other groups (all ps > 0.055; observed power = 0.38/0.42 for 
ambivalent vs. engagers during S5/S6, 0.49/0.07 for ambiva-
lent vs. avoiders during S5/S6, and 0.17/0.05 for ambivalent 
vs. indifferent during S5/S6; a priori power = 0.24 for ambiv-
alent vs. engagers, 0.25 for ambivalent vs. avoiders, and 
0.30 for ambivalent vs. indifferent, assuming d = 0.5), while 
the engagers group continued to have a higher PVT bias 
score than avoiders and indifferent groups (all ps < 0.021; 
observed power = 0.75/0.54 for engagers vs. avoiders dur-
ing S5/S6, and 0.71/0.53 for engagers vs. indifferent dur-
ing S5/S6; a priori power = 0.28 for engagers vs. avoiders, 
and 0.34 for engagers vs. indifferent, assuming d = 0.5). 
During S7–S9, the engagers group had a higher PVT 
bias score than all other groups (all ps < 0.002; observed 
power = 0.90/0.91/0.74 for engagers vs. avoiders during S7/
S8/S9, 0.65/0.85/0.72 for engagers vs. ambivalent during S7/
S8/S9, and 0.94/0.98/0.87 for engagers vs. indifferent dur-
ing S7/S8/S9; a priori power = 0.28 for engagers vs. avoid-
ers, 0.24 for engagers vs. ambivalent, and 0.34 for engagers 
vs. indifferent, assuming d = 0.5). During S10, there was no 
significant difference in PVT bias score between the engag-
ers group and all other groups (all ps > 0.335; observed 
power = 0.36 for engagers vs avoiders, 0.41 for engagers vs. 
ambivalent, and 0.09 for engagers vs. indifferent; a priori 
































Fig. 1  Proportion of viewing time bias scores across group and segment. Note: Error bars represent ±1 standard error
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ambivalent, and 0.34 for engagers vs. indifferent, assuming 
d = 0.5).
Taken together, these results provide partial support to 
our second set of hypotheses that the ambivalent group 
looked at the spider less than the engagers and more than 
the avoiders, but this was only present during the third and 
fourth segments. In all other segments (except the last seg-
ment), the engagers group continued to demonstrate the most 
robust attentional bias to threat.
Did Spider Fear, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect 
Differ According to Motivation?
We hypothesized that the ambivalent group would, uniquely, 
have greater spider fear and more negative affect at the end 
of the study than other groups. Means and standard devia-
tions of spider fear, positive affect, and negative affect across 
group and time are presented in Table 5.
We first conducted a 3 (time 1 vs. time 2 vs. time 3) × 4 
(ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) mixed 
ANOVA on spider fear ratings. There was a main effect of 
time, F (2, 184) = 68.91, η2p = 0.428, p < 0.001, observed 
power = 1.00, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); 
a main effect of group, F (3, 92) = 11.33, η2p = 0.270, 
p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a priori power = 1.00 
(assuming d = 0.5); and a time by group interaction, F (6, 
184) = 4.65, η2p = 0.132, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, 
a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5). To explore this 
interaction, we conducted one-way ANOVAs at each time 
point. There was a main effect of group on spider fear after 
initial introduction of the spider F (3, 92) = 8.31, η2p = 0.213, 
p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a priori power = 0.99 
(assuming d = 0.5); and at the end of the study, F (3, 
92) = 18.41, η2p = 0.375, p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a 
priori power = 0.99 (assuming d = 0.5); but not at baseline, F 
(3, 92) = 2.22, η2p = 0.067, p = 0.091, observed power = 0.56, 
a priori power = 0.99 (assuming d = 0.5). Post hoc compari-
sons (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that after the initial intro-
duction of the spider, the avoiders and ambivalent groups 
reported significantly higher spider fear than the indifferent 
group (both ps < 0.001; observed power = 0.97 for avoiders 
vs. indifferent, and 0.98 for ambivalent vs. indifferent; a 
priori power = 0.46 for avoiders vs. indifferent, and 0.38 for 
ambivalent vs. indifferent, assuming d = 0.5). However, at 
the end of the study, the ambivalent group reported signifi-
cantly higher spider fear than all other groups (all ps < 0.007; 
observed power = 0.99 for ambivalent vs. engagers, 0.80 for 
ambivalent vs. avoiders, and 1.00 for ambivalent vs. indif-
ferent; a priori power = 0.29 for ambivalent vs. engagers, 
0.32 for ambivalent vs. avoiders, and 0.38 for ambivalent 
vs. indifferent, assuming d = 0.5).
We then conducted the same 3 (time 1 vs. time 2 vs. 
time 3) × 4 (ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indif-
ferent) mixed ANOVA on positive affect ratings. Mauch-
ly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated, χ2 (2) = 13.93, p = 0.001, therefore degrees 
of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of 
sphericity (ε = 0.920). This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of time, F (1.84, 169.36) = 8.70, η2p = 0.077, 
p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a priori power = 1.00 
(assuming d = 0.5); a significant time by group interaction, 
F (5.52, 169.36) = 2.27, η2p = 0.069, p = 0.044, observed 
power = 0.99, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); 
but no main effect of group, F (3, 92) = 0.93, η2p = 0.029, 
p = 0.430, observed power = 0.34, a priori power = 1.00 
(assuming d = 0.5). To explore this interaction, we con-
ducted one-way ANOVAs at each time point and found no 
significant main effect of group (all ps > 0.238; observed 
Table 5  Means and standard deviations of spider fear, positive affect, and negative affect across group and time
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. One-way ANOVAs were performed to examine between-group differences. 
***p < 0.001
Ambivalent (N = 16) Engagers (N = 18) Avoiders (N = 22) Indifferent (N = 40) F
Spider fear
 T1: Baseline 62.19 (17.50) 50.61 (24.42) 59.41 (17.43) 48.28 (24.50) 2.22
 T2: After introduction to spider 78.31 (14.29) 65.33 (23.84) 74.73 (14.79) 50.43 (28.35) 8.31***
 T3: At end of study 65.06 (23.33) 32.06 (16.85) 42.68 (23.62) 21.23 (19.22) 18.41***
Positive affect
 T1: Baseline 30.56 (6.98) 29.83 (6.66) 27.09 (6.99) 29.75 (7.50) 0.95
 T2: After introduction to spider 28.75 (8.93) 29.11 (7.16) 25.41 (7.81) 29.68 (7.98) 1.44
 T3: At end of study 28.63 (6.87) 28.11 (9.40) 25.45 (8.95) 25.00 (7.66) 1.14
Negative affect
 T1: Baseline 21.62 (4.11) 19.72 (6.07) 20.32 (4.43) 18.75 (5.11) 1.37
 T2: After introduction to spider 27.69 (4.42) 23.78 (6.81) 26.36 (5.70) 20.67 (7.24) 6.25***
 T3: At end of study 23.56 (7.83) 15.28 (4.00) 16.55 (5.60) 12.88 (3.26) 17.89***
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power = 0.26 for time 1, 0.38 for time 2, and 0.31 for time 
3; a priori power = 0.99, assuming d = 0.5).
We also conducted the same 3 (time 1 vs. time 2 vs. 
time 3) × 4 (ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indif-
ferent) mixed ANOVA on negative affect ratings. There 
was a main effect of time, F (2, 184) = 75.08, η2p = 0.449, 
p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori power = 1.00 
(assuming d = 0.5); a main effect of group, F (3, 92) = 9.99, 
η2p = 0.246, p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a priori 
power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5); and a time by group inter-
action, F (6, 184) = 4.59, η2p = 0.130, p < 0.001, observed 
power = 1.00, a priori power = 1.00 (assuming d = 0.5). To 
better understand this interaction, we conducted one-way 
ANOVAs at each time point. Results showed a main effect 
of group on negative affect after initial introduction of the 
spider, F (3, 92) = 6.25, η2p = 0.169, p < 0.001, observed 
power = 0.96, a priori power = 0.99 (assuming d = 0.5); 
and at the end of the study, F (3, 92) = 17.89, η2p = 0.368, 
p < 0.001, observed power = 1.00, a priori power = 0.99 
(assuming d = 0.5); but not at baseline, F (3, 92) = 1.37, 
η2p = 0.030, p = 0.256, observed power = 0.26, a priori 
power = 0.99 (assuming d = 0.5). Post hoc comparisons 
(Tukey’s HSD) revealed that after initial introduction of 
the spider, the avoiders and ambivalent groups reported 
significantly higher negative affect than the indifferent 
group (both ps < 0.007; observed power = 0.89 for avoid-
ers vs. indifferent, and 0.97 for ambivalent vs. indifferent; 
a priori power = 0.46 for avoiders vs. indifferent, and 0.38 
for ambivalent vs. indifferent, assuming d = 0.5). At the 
end of the study, the ambivalent group had greater nega-
tive affect than all other groups (all ps < 0.001; observed 
power = 0.69 for ambivalent vs. engagers, 0.86 for ambiva-
lent vs. avoiders, and 0.99 for ambivalent vs. indifferent; 
a priori power = 0.29 for ambivalent vs. engagers, 0.32 
for ambivalent vs. avoiders, and 0.38 for ambivalent vs. 
indifferent, assuming d = 0.5).
Hence, our third hypothesis was confirmed: ambivalent 
individuals reported higher spider fear and more negative 
affect at the end of the study than all other motivation 
groups. While other groups demonstrated habituation to 
threat over the course of the study (as demonstrated by sig-
nificant reductions in both spider fear and negative affect), 
ambivalent individuals did not.
Did Performance on the Metronome Response Task 
Differ According to Motivation?
Means and standard deviations of MRT performance meas-
ures are presented in Table 6. To examine the impact of 
motivation on MRT performance, we conducted multiple 
one-way ANOVAs in which each performance measure was 
tested as a function of group (i.e., ambivalent vs. engagers 
vs. avoiders vs. indifferent). We observed a significant main 
effect of group for mean RRT variance, F (3, 92) = 2.92, 
η2p = 0.087, p = 0.038, observer power = 0.69, a priori 
power = 0.99 (assuming d = 0.5); and for the proportion 
of spider-related thoughts, F (3, 92) = 10.54, η2p = 0.256, 
p < 0.001, observed power = 0.99, a priori power = 0.99 
(assuming d = 0.5). Post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) 
revealed that the engagers group displayed higher mean 
RRT variance than the indifferent group, p = 0.041, observer 
power = 0.66, a priori power = 0.41 (assuming d = 0.5), indi-
cating poorer performance throughout the MRT. In addi-
tion, the engagers group also reported a higher proportion 
of spider-related thoughts than the avoiders and indifferent 
groups (both ps < 0.001; observer power = 0.92 for engager 
vs. avoiders, and 0.99 for engagers vs. indifferent; a priori 
power = 0.34 for engagers vs. avoiders, and 0.41 for engagers 
vs. indifferent, assuming d = 0.5).
Therefore, only the engagers group demonstrated differ-
ent performance on the MRT: they had more thoughts about 
the spider and performed more poorly overall. There was 
not significant difference in task performance between the 
ambivalent, avoiders, and indifferent groups.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of 
motivation to look at or to avoid looking at threat on atten-
tional deployment, spider fear, and mood state while individ-
uals complete an attentionally demanding task. Participants 
varied in their motivation to look at or to avoid looking at 
the spider. Motivation to look at the spider had very little 
relationship with motivation to perform well on the current 
task, indicating that participants held goals that were inde-
pendent of each other. Consistent with Nelson et al. (2015), 
Table 6  Means and standard 
deviations of MRT performance 
measures by group
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets; RRT rhythmic response time. One-way 










Mean RRT variance 7.89 (0.40) 8.28 (0.52) 7.98 (0.36) 7.93 (0.49) 2.92*
Proportion of spider-
related thoughts %
44.79 (21.92) 56.48 (20.92) 35.26 (17.30) 30.00 (13.32) 10.54***
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ratings of motivation to look at the spider and motivation 
to avoid looking were not correlated. As predicted, some 
participants had low motivation to both look and to avoid 
looking (indifferent), some were highly motivated to look 
(engagers), others were highly motivated to avoid looking 
(avoiders), and some (n = 16) had equally high motivation 
to look and to avoid looking (ambivalent).
Traditionally, anxiety has been characterized as a domi-
nance of avoidance motivation over approach motivation 
regarding threat (e.g., Fowles 1987) and it is often assumed 
that approach and avoidance motivation should have an 
inverse relationship (see Chen and Bargh 1999). This is also 
reflected in research methods such as the approach-avoid-
ance task (Klein et al. 2011; Rinck and Becker 2007), which 
assumes that participants either approach (by pulling the 
object towards oneself) or avoid (by pushing the object away 
from oneself). This conceptual framework implies that anx-
ious individuals are a homogenous population and have to 
choose one response over another when encountering threat. 
The current study revealed contradictory findings: motiva-
tion to look at the spider was not correlated with motivation 
to avoid looking at the spider, and spider-fearful individu-
als could be classified into four different motivation groups. 
More importantly, different motivation groups demonstrated 
different visual attention to spider, reported different levels 
of spider fear and negative affect, and also performed differ-
ently on the MRT. If we had treated our sample as a homoge-
nous group and analyzed the data as a whole, we would have 
missed this significant variance and drawn conclusions that 
are inaccurate. Moreover, as we observed small to moderate 
correlations between motivation ratings and various depend-
ent measures (same as in Nelson et al. 2015), we believe it 
is unlikely that our motivation ratings reflected participants’ 
post-hoc evaluation of their visual attention to threat.
Our second hypothesis was that participants’ motivation 
to look at or to avoid looking at the spider would influence 
their visual attention to it. Based on Nelson et al. (2015), 
we hypothesized that the ambivalent group would uniquely 
exhibit initial facilitated attention to the spider. Instead we 
found both ambivalent and engagers groups were more likely 
to have their first fixations on the spider than gift cards. 
Thus, ambivalent motivation may not be uniquely associ-
ated with hypervigilance towards threat. This is consistent 
with findings from previous studies showing that most spi-
der-fearful individuals presented with facilitated orienting 
towards spider stimuli (Mogg and Bradley 2006; Ohman 
et al. 2001; Vrijsen et al. 2009). However, the engagers and 
ambivalent groups differed on how they maintained their ini-
tial attention on threat. While the engagers group had longer 
first fixations on the spider than gift cards, the ambivalent 
group showed no such difference. This finding is contra-
dictory to some earlier studies in which spider-fearful indi-
viduals demonstrated difficulty in disengaging from threat 
(Paulitzki et al. 2008; Wilson et al. 2015). More research is 
need to confirm if ambivalent individuals can be character-
ized by initial facilitated orienting to threat but little or no 
maintenance of initial attention on threat.
As in Nelson et al. (2015), each motivation group showed 
different viewing patterns over the course of the MRT. When 
we examined attentional bias to threat across the 10 view-
ing intervals, we saw that the engagers group consistently 
exhibited stronger attentional bias to threat, while the avoid-
ers and indifferent group consistently exhibited weaker or no 
attentional bias to threat. On the contrary, the ambivalent 
group showed a weak threat bias in the first two intervals, a 
stronger threat bias in the third and fourth intervals (on par 
with the engagers group), followed by a weak threat bias in 
the rest of the intervals. This observation provides support to 
our hypothesis that different motivation groups would have 
different patterns of visual attention to threat across time. 
However, it remains unclear to us why the ambivalent group 
experienced a sudden increase in their attentional bias to 
threat. More research is needed to explore if our finding can 
be replicated, and if so, what may account for this change. 
Future work may want to look at impact of one gaze on the 
next, as it was done in I. Amir et al. (2016).
Our findings also suggest that people who are motivated 
to avoid or monitor a threat are quite able to exert control 
over their attention. This was further supported by our 
observation that the engagers group reported more spider-
related thoughts and performed more poorly on the MRT 
(as they were supposedly more motivated to pay attention 
to the spider). However, for those who are experiencing a 
conflict between both wanting to avoid the treat and wanting 
to monitor the treat, they would have difficulty deciding on 
where to deploy their attention (as demonstrated by initial 
orienting to threat but no maintenance of initial attention on 
threat, and significant fluctuations in their visual attention 
to threat over time).
Our third hypothesis was that the ambivalent group would 
have higher spider fear at the end of the study than other 
groups, and that they would have a more negative mood 
state than those in other groups. Both hypotheses were con-
firmed. It was noteworthy that whereas the engagers, avoid-
ers, and indifferent groups all showed a significant decrease 
in spider fear and negative affect to below baseline levels, 
the ambivalent group did not. The indifferent group did not 
seem to find the spider particularly threatening, showing no 
significant increase in spider fear after being introduced to 
the spider. Such findings cannot be attributed to pre-existing 
differences in spider anxiety, as all four motivation groups 
scored similarly on the FSQ.
The engagers and avoiders did report greater spider fear 
after being introduced to it, but their fear seemed to have 
habituated over the course of the study, and negative affect 
also declined. However, consistent with Nelson et al. (2015), 
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the ambivalent group seemed to experience the most dis-
tress. It may be that whereas the engagers mindfully prior-
itized the goal of threat monitoring over performance, the 
avoiders prioritized emotion regulation and/or performance. 
The ambivalent group may have been unable to prioritize 
and then felt as if they were failing at both monitoring 
threat and at emotion regulation/performance. These data 
suggest that the problem in persistent anxiety may not be 
so much attentional biases to threat, but capacity to resolve 
conflicting goals. Although the current study demonstrated 
that ambivalent motivation may be particularly relevant to 
anxiety, it remains unclear where this motivation derives 
from. More research is needed to look into factors that may 
account for ambivalent motivation in some anxious individu-
als but not others, such as personality traits, threat-related 
beliefs, and chronicity of anxiety symptoms.
There are several limitations to the current study. The 
first limitation is the small sample size. As almost half of 
our participants endorsed an indifferent attitude towards the 
spider, we had fewer than 20 participants in the ambivalent 
and engagers group and barely above 20 participants in the 
avoiders group. This small sample size introduced more 
variance in our data and contributed to low statistic power 
as observed in some of our results. We recommend future 
researchers to recruit more participants and potentially indi-
viduals who have been diagnosed with a spider phobia. Sim-
ilarly, due to the multi-modality design of the current study, 
we conducted a considerable number of comparisons on 
various outcome measures (including eye movement indices, 
subjective ratings, and MRT performance measures) across 
multiple time intervals (i.e., ten segments of eye movement 
data), which could lead to inflated Type I error rates (Ranga-
nathan et al. 2016). This is a common issue for eye tracking 
studies. Although we attempted to ameliorate this problem 
by only testing a priori hypotheses, limiting the number of 
analyses, and confirming our findings using a similar and yet 
different measure (e.g., spider fear vs. negative affect, RRT 
variance vs. spider-related thoughts, overall bias to threat 
vs. bias to threat over time), readers should be aware of this 
limitation when interpreting our results. Another limitation 
is that we only measured spider fear using subjective reports. 
We are confident that subjective reports provided reliable 
measures of spider fear in the present study, as there was a 
significant correlation between the one-item SUDS and the 
negative affect subscale of PANAS, and we were able to 
detect fear activation and habituation using these measures. 
However, future studies should consider including objective 
measures of spider fear, such as the behavioural avoidance 
test (e.g., Van Bockstaele et al. 2011) and startle response 
to spider stimuli (e.g., Kashdan et al. 2012). Lastly, we lost 
a considerable amount of data because of the portable eye 
tracking technology we used in the current study. We were 
unable to access some of the participants’ eye movements in 
one segment and some of our participants had a low tracking 
ratio. The current technology also lacked precision, which 
made it challenging to study early vs. late stage of attention. 
Future researchers might want to consider using more reli-
able and precise eye tracking technology.
It should also be noted that our results only pertain to 
individuals with spider fear. It is possible that individuals 
without spider fear may behave differently because they do 
not view the spider as a threat. Nonetheless, more research 
is needed to confirm this hypothesis. In addition, the current 
study lacked a true control object for the live spider. We 
included the basket of gift cards as a reminder to participants 
that task performance is important (as they would receive 
an additional reward) and also to create a situation where 
participants would face competing demands (i.e., attending 
to task vs. attending to spider), which is more analogous to 
real-life encounters of threat. Our strategy seemed to have 
worked as most of our participants reported high motiva-
tion to do well on the task. Although we did not intend to 
use the gift cards as a control object, gift cards and spider 
were the only two salient stimuli in participants’ visual field 
and almost all participants did look at both stimuli. Hence, 
we decided to compare eye movement data between them. 
However, attending to gift cards should not be mistaken 
for engaging in the current task, as participants might have 
done so for different reasons. Some might see gift cards as a 
distraction from the spider, others might use gift cards as a 
point of focus or an incentive to do well on the task. Our data 
seemed to support this, as we found no significant correla-
tion between visual attention to gift cards and performance 
on the MRT.
Another relevant issue is that the gift cards did not control 
for some of the features that are unique to the spider (e.g., 
being a moving animal). This raised the question of whether 
our findings are spider-specific, or as some research has sug-
gested (Lipp et al. 2004), animal-specific. We believe our 
results are more specific to spider, as we observed small to 
moderate correlations between motivation ratings towards 
spider and other outcome variables, and the observed effects 
are similar to those from Nelson et al. (2015) where they 
paired a variety of threat images with control images. There 
may be merits in including a true control object that is neu-
tral and moving (e.g., a non-threatening animal of a similar 
size) in future studies.
Nonetheless, results from the present study have impor-
tant implications for treating anxiety in clinical practice. 
Performing the MRT in close proximity to a live tarantula 
for 30 min can be considered as a behavioural exposure 
for spider-fearful individuals. Almost all participants 
reported a significant increase in spider fear upon see-
ing the tarantula, which is consistent with the observation 
that anxious individuals show fear activation in the begin-
ning of exposure therapy (see Kamphuis and Telch 2000). 
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At the end of this exposure, the engagers, avoiders, and 
indifferent groups all reported a significant decrease in 
spider fear, which is again consistent with the observation 
that anxious individuals show fear habituation over the 
course of exposure therapy (see Kashdan et al. 2012). On 
the contrary, ambivalent individuals were the only group 
whose anxiety did not decline in response to exposure. 
Our findings suggest that ambivalent motivation towards 
threat may play a critical role in the maintenance of anxi-
ety. This may explain why some anxious individuals do 
not respond to exposure therapy (see Andersson et al. 
2009; Zlomke and Davis 2008), as they may be unable 
to resolve this approach-avoidance conflict and feel torn 
in their deployment of attention towards threat. Hence, 
we recommend clinicians to have a discussion with their 
clients about motivation to look and to avoid looking prior 
to conducting exposure therapy, and address clients’ pre-
dictions about what would happen if they look and what 
would happen if they avoid looking. The goal is to encour-
age ambivalent individuals to look more at the threat dur-
ing exposure, as it predicts better treatment outcome. 
In addition, clinicians should work with their clients in 
monitoring motivation towards threat throughout exposure 
therapy. This can be easily done by asking clients to rate 
their motivation to look and avoid looking on a Likert 
scale (as in our study), as they may be less aware of the 
extent to which they visually approach and avoid threat.
In summary, the present study offered strong support for 
the idea that people vary in their motivation to attend to vs. 
avoid attending to threat, that situational factors and goal 
prioritization may influence motivation, that motivation 
has a powerful influence on visual attention to threat, and 
that people exhibit considerable attentional control based 
on their motivation. The findings suggest that anxiety per-
sistence may have more to do with goal prioritization than 
innate attentional biases. Future studies of attentional biases 
to threat should both take motivation into account and study 
attention across the time course. Ambivalent motivation to 
threat should also be targeted in exposure therapy.
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